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ABSTRACT: Public understanding of science and public engagement around science policy issues takes place 
within a complex system involving public opinion, values, identities, social groups, media, and social, economic, 
and political structures and influences. This paper offers a theory of agency that bridges the psychological and 
sociological and thereby offers a theoretical framework for understanding the system underlying public 
understanding of science, support for science, and the implications of public engagement. Agency theory 
integrates elements of well-established social science theories into an understanding of human agency. Strategies 
for improved public engagement are discussed. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public attitudes toward and understanding of science are the result of processes both at the 
level of individual psychology and social structure. Existing social sciences and social science 
theories, however, tend to focus on one or the other of these possibilities. This suggests that the 
study of the public understanding of science would benefit from a theory that allows a clear 
picture of both psychological and sociological processes and their relationships. In addition, 
many existing social science theories either assume people are guided by strong forms of 
rationality or are at the mercy of various non-rational causal mechanisms. The study of the 
public understanding of science would benefit from a theoretical approach that can clarify the 
evident irrationalities of much public opinion but allow for the possibility of people engaging 
more rationally with science under good conditions. Without the possibility of rational 
engagement, the study of the public understanding of science would offer only a dismal picture 
of the public, one at odds with the presumptive rationality of science itself, and little hope for 
meaningful public engagement. This paper offers a theory of agency that bridges the 
psychological and the sociological as well as the rational and irrational. The theory is applied 
to public understanding of and trust in science and to public engagement on science policy 
issues. Potential research areas and hypotheses are proposed. 
2. AGENCY THEORY 
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Agency is the exercise of choice in thought and behavior. A theory of agency needs to explain 
what “choice” is and how choice is exercised or fails to be exercised. Theories of agency are 
plentiful, both in everyday life and the social sciences, albeit not necessarily explicitly stated. 
When people say that a person can change their way of life, for example from alcoholism to 
abstinence, by following certain steps, they are implying a theory of agency.  
 When psychologists assert that people’s decisions and thoughts are subject to 
systematic departures from rationality (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) or to group 
pressures (Mendelberg, 2002), they imply that people have a lack of free choice. With the 
current mountain of such psychologically deterministic findings, it is tempting to infer that 
people do not exercise choice. When other psychologists suggest that people do what they do 
because they are politically astute actors (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999) or because they are 
managing the conception of their own efficacy (Bandura, 2001), this implies forms of rational 
agency.  
 Many rational choice theorists and economists offer or imply another theory of agency 
when they assert that behavior can be explained by people’s actions to maximize the 
fulfillment of their preferences (Elster, 1986). Preferences are understood as unchangeable and 
not socially influenced and as fully weighed relative to each other. Actions are always 
instrumental—that is, taken to alter states of the (external) world. This conception of agency 
does not allow for expressive as opposed to instrumental action (Abelson, 1995), preferences 
that change or are socially influenced, people to have trouble weighing between different 
preferences, or people to be unable to maximize their preferences (Simon, 1969). 
 This paper invokes a theory of agency that the authors will simply call “agency theory.” 
It attempts to discern a plausible understanding of human agency by synthesizing aspects of 
Carver and Scheier’s (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1999) self-regulation theory, aspects of 
adaptive complex systems theory (Mobus & Kalton, 2015), self-determination theory (Ryan, 
2000), social identity theory (Hogg, 1996) Mead’s psychology (Mead, 1962), action 
identification theory (Vallacher & Wegner, 2000), and other sources. Agency theory seeks a 
middle path between psychological determinism and the constrained free choice of rational 
choice theory. It allows for and explains both highly determined choices and “free” choices in 
thought and behavior, and it seeks to understand the conditions under which choices are free. It 
also allows for expressive behavior, social influence, and uncertainty over values. It also, as 
explained below, bridges both psychological and social-structural explanations. 
2.1 Complex Adaptive Systems 
Agency theory begins with the view that people and societies are complex adaptive systems 
that are subject to the constraints and features of such systems, wherever they are found—in 
biology, software code, people, or societies. Adaptive systems take in information from their 
environments and adjust their responses to the environment to better achieve their internal 
goals. One key feature is feedback loops. In response to a complex, ever-changing environment 
that is impossible to predict precisely, it is most adaptive for a system to set goals and 
continually adjust its behavior and, at times, its goals, in response to new information from the 
environment. The environment, in turn, responds to the system’s behavior, thus completing a 
feedback loop. Another system property implied by feedback loops is equilibrium, which 
occurs when the system is achieving its goals and does not need to adjust its outputs. 
Prolonged equilibrium may be rare. 
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 Another key feature of complex adaptive systems is modularity. The processes 
involved in transforming environmental inputs into effective adaptive behaviors are extremely 
complex. Wherever systems are found, this complexity is managed be subdividing the needed 
processes into relatively discrete functional units or modules, each of which can complete 
some small task and be reused for different purposes (‘reuse’ is an important property of 
modules). Modules take input and reliably give certain outputs without the larger system 
having to keep track of what goes on in the module—a property called ‘encapsulation.’ In 
encapsulation, the components and transformations of information in the module are hidden 
from the larger system, which only needs to be aware of what inputs a module takes and what 
kinds of outputs it generates from these inputs.  
 Without modularity, complex adaptive systems may well be impossible. A programmer 
seeking to write software with hundreds of thousands of lines of code without modules (and 
thereby separated namespaces) would be faced with a virtually impossible problem—trying to 
keep all the variables in mind and all the uses and transformations of these variables in mind so 
that the next line of code will not in some way have disastrous consequences for something 
else the software needs to do. Looked at another way, the number of possible interactions of 
variables or of transformations of variables rises exponentially with the number of these 
variables and transformations. Encapsulated modules isolate variables and transformations 
from the same in other modules, thereby vastly reducing the complexity of writing another line 
of good code. What holds for software also holds for biological systems. Organisms are 
organized into encapsulated modules: DNA (in part organized into modules called genes) and 
other cell components, cells, organs, organ systems, social groups, and societies. It is far easier 
for evolution to create viable organisms when the search space for its genetic algorithm is 
vastly reduced by modularity and the possibility of gene reuse. 
 Another key property of complex adaptive systems is ‘nesting.’ The nesting of modules 
builds complexity with nested hierarchies of modules. Consider a person driving down a street. 
At a basic level, this involves the working of individual neurons. Many of the neurons involved 
are in the cerebellum and are organized into complex modules that control motor action—that 
is, they coordinate the firing of myriads of muscle groups into complex behaviors that allow a 
person to steer a car. The complexity of this might be made clear imagining the trouble a 
toddler would have driving a car, even if the car were the right size and the toddler was 
determined to drive down the street. The motor cortex’s actions are further controlled by 
modules of neurons in other parts of the brain that advise the motor cortex to stay between the 
lines on the road and obey a multitude of other traffic rules, using various feedback loops. 
Beyond this, other parts of the brain are regulating goal-directed activity, such as getting to a 
meeting on time and going to, say, a political meeting in order to enact the driver’s identity as a 
Democrat or Republican—also all regulated with feedback loops. Moving from the individual 
driver to social groups and society, the meeting is organized by people with certain identities 
and understandings who are seeking to replicate certain social structures that legitimize and 
otherwise further the objectives of a political party, which is itself nested in larger social 
structures such as nation, government, and a ‘public.’ Thus, driving down the street can be 
viewed as an activity in which a multiplicity of nested modules are involved, from neurons and 
below, to identities, to nations. 
 An important further property of most complex adaptive systems is emergence—the 
development of properties based on the interactions of modules that are hard to imagine from 
the isolated operation of modules. It is difficult to imagine identities and nations from a close 
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examination of the functioning of individual neurons. A final important system property is 
subsumption. In subsumption, higher levels of nested hierarchies of modules need have little 
involvement in or knowledge of lower levels of nested modules. Conscious attention need have 
no knowledge of the organization of motor functions or of muscle groups in the execution of 
motor skills. Consciousness simply wills that a certain action be undertaken, and it is (for now 
ignoring training of behaviors). Part of this lack of knowledge is due to encapsulation, but 
another part is that consciousness need not even be aware of the inputs and outputs of lower-
level modules, something handled by intermediate modules. 
2.2 People as Complex Adaptive Agents 
One of the most important emergent properties for understanding social phenomena is 
reflexivity, which depends on yet other important emergent properties, such as consciousness 
and self-awareness. People are, to varying degrees, capable of modifying their own systems, 
both individual and social—including goals and modules. The first step in reflexivity is 
building a model of the system, which people do through language that describes the system 
and its functioning. Language and the reasoning it makes possible then utilize this model to 
identify limitations and problems with the system and pathways to fixing these issues. For 
example, someone learning to dance seeks to describe what they are doing wrong and then 
repeatedly practices the movement paying conscious attention to fixing small aspects of their 
movement until the whole works and is made automatic. In effect, they are programming their 
motor cortex with a model and conscious attention. Notice that it is hard work for conscious 
attention to modify even small movement sequences.  
 Several important propositions in agency theory stem from this analysis. In agency 
theory, model building and effortful conscious behavioral change encompasses everything 
from changing dance steps to changing identities and social arrangements. Behavior here is 
construed broadly and can include thought patterns such as values, attitudes, and emotions as 
well as physical actions. A second key point is that conscious attention is highly limited, a 
point also made in dual-processing theories (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). The vast majority of 
human behavior depends on automated modules and processes, with conscious attention 
utilized either as high level director—making sure that actions are unfolding as it plans, goals 
are being achieved, and the right general modules are being activated in the right sequence—or 
as an effortful reprogrammer of errant or new modules. This does not mean that behavior is 
outside conscious control, but that such control typically requires the agent to have been 
thoughtfully involved in programming behavioral modules. 
 On the other hand, it is also not the case that behavioral modules are necessarily 
programmed with a high degree of reflexivity. People have limited life spans, likely much 
more limited in the evolutionary past than today, and need to adapt to complex social 
arrangements. Moreover, to the extent that survival for people is group survival, survival and, 
therefore, the perpetuation of one’s genes, is enhanced by rapid adaptation of people to their 
social groups so they can play useful roles that benefit the group. Unsurprisingly, then, 
children rapidly absorb social roles and identities and the associated norms and behaviors 
through modeling behavior on observation of others (Bandura, 1976) and play in which 
children practice roles and identities (Mead, 1962). Something as simple as mimicry of roles 
internalizes behaviors that imply certain ideas and attitudes toward others. Children play acting 
parental roles in a sexist society internalize behaviors that, if not later corrected, will replicate 
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sexism. Moreover, if these roles are later examined, sexist assumptions will, on less than very 
thorough consideration, seem natural and obvious because these ideas are implied by 
behavioral patterns that appear to have always existed in the person. Mimicry programs roles 
and identities largely without reflexivity, both because children do not have well-developed 
models of self or society to critically reflect on what they are absorbing and because mimicry 
substantially sidesteps critical processes. Also, the realities of encapsulation and subsumption 
within self-constructs work to erase the memory of how identities and roles were internalized. 
 Adaptive systems have goals, and for people the goals generally are part of roles and 
identities. These can be thought of in several ways. Roles and identities can be viewed as 
modules that contain organized collections of interrelated goals (or norms), emotional 
predispositions towards goals and goal attainment, understandings regarding when particular 
goals apply and for what purposes, and behavioral scripts for achieving the goals. People 
generally do not have a single role or identity, but a multiplicity. They activate those roles and 
identities that seem relevant to their current contexts, to address difficulties with execution of 
identities or roles in the current context by switching to alternatives, or to achieve consistency 
with some general sense of self. Identity might also be viewed as that which gives a person 
continuity over time, through varying experiences and changing environments, by offering 
abstract goals that can be consistently pursued through changing circumstances.  
 Given, however, that people have multiple identities triggered in part by context, such 
identities at best offer fragments of consistency. It is necessary to stipulate a “self” that 
involves more abstract goals that can lend coherence to the multiplicity of identities and role 
choices. The self necessarily requires a high degree of reflexivity in which a person critically 
reflects on identities and roles and selects and modifies these into a consistent whole. The 
extent to which people have such a self may vary. Identities and roles differ, albeit with fuzzy 
boundaries, in that identities help define what people are while roles, adopted for specific 
social tasks, only define what people do. This distinction is not critical to what follows and will 
therefore be collapsed into the term “identity.” The cognitive structure and functioning of 
identities is an area for further development in agency theory and may benefit from insights 
from role theory, identity control theory (Burke, 2006; Stryker & Burke, 2000), and coherentist 
models of cognition (Thagard, 2000; Thagard & Kroon, 2006). 
 Importantly, identities can consist of two components—automated processes and 
linguistic models of the identities. Given how identities are absorbed from the social 
environment, their linguistic models can be quite underdeveloped relative to what the 
automated processes contain. Through self-development, people develop improved models of 
their identities, are better able to correct these identities and make them consistent with each 
other in the process of developing a self, and develop a critical capacity with respect to their 
identities. People may be unsure of what actually is in the body of automated processes that 
constitute their identities and how these diverge from their linguistic model of self. Thus, 
people might consider themselves brave, but whether they are brave will depend on how they 
act under duress, based on automated processes. This uncertainty about identity and the 
dependence of identity on action rather than simply thought, detailed in self-perception theory 
and self-affirmation theory (Bem, 1967; Steele, 1988), gives rise to the need for expressive 
behavior—behavior undertaken to exercise a desired identity and not to change the state of the 
external world. 
 It is now possible to offer a more sophisticated definition of agency. Agency is the 
capacity of people to choose and successfully execute goal-directed actions on behalf of a well-
PETER MUHLBERGER & LISA PYTLIK-ZILLIG 
114 
developed self or reflexively-chosen identities. This is a matter of degree—people have greater 
agency to the extent that their actions are steered by more reflexively chosen identities or, 
better still, a well-developed self. Many people, perhaps most, fall far short of being full 
agents. As indicated in Kantian (Kant, 1974) and more modern ethical theories (Gewirth, 
1978), a good society and ethics require respect for people’s agency. Given the dependence of 
people’s agency on self-development and social structural conditions that affect such 
development (Bowles & Gintis, 1986), ethics requires the furtherance of that agency. 
2.3 Social Identity, Social Structure and Collective Intelligence 
People do develop individual identities grounded in their needs and desires—identities that can 
be contrary to the demands of their society. Nevertheless, most of the identities children adopt 
are absorbed from society and are social identities, not identities that focus on individuality. 
People are not merely capable of being social, they are in part socially constituted, albeit they 
also carry at least the possibility of individualistic divergence from social identities and 
prescriptions because they have individual identities and are capable of being agents. 
Nevertheless, as Durkheim suggests (Durkheim, 1952), many identities stressing seeming 
“individuality” may actually be social in origins, socially defined, and functional for modern 
societies.  
 Because of the social constitution of people, all aspects of social identity and self-
categorization theories (Hogg, 1996; Hogg & Abrams, 1999) are applicable. Some relevant 
findings in research on these theories include that people are highly sensitive to social status, 
choose their identity in a given context so as to enhance that status relative to people in other 
groups, and selectively attend to, process, and remember information in a biased fashion to 
promote the status of their group and, thereby, themselves. Social identity theory was, in part, 
developed to help understand the racial hatred that led to the Holocaust. It is also, however, 
possible in agency theory for people’s development to reach a point at which social identity 
biases are limited, though this may not describe most people. 
 Social structural factors, particularly social structural demand, influence the 
development of an integrated self and of reflexivity. People are complex adaptive systems—if 
their current poorly integrated selection of identities is sufficient to achieve internal goals 
given environmental conditions, they are adequately adapted and there is no external pressure 
for them to pursue further self-development. The social environment can play several roles 
here. It can make goals easy to reach, but it can also disseminate identities with easy to reach 
goals. The belief systems the environment disseminates regarding authority, personal worth, 
and what is valuable also shape which identities are attractive. Finally, the mix of identities 
that are frequently triggered by the environment may be those with easy to reach goals. This 
can involve the environment steering attention, which selects the current active identity or role, 
away from some identities and toward others. The environment can also tie up attention 
resources so a person is too preoccupied to notice inconsistencies among identities or devote 
the effort needed to correct such inconsistencies. An important feature of social structure is 
how it systematically directs or redirects people’s limited attention resources. The economy of 
attention is appreciably socially structured, including the structure of communication—the 
people, organizations, and communications with which people are likely to interact or to which 
they are likely to be exposed. Another way of looking at the influence of the social 
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environment is that people generally become what is demanded of them by their society 
(Bowles & Gintis, 1986). 
 Some people, however, are less susceptible to social structural shaping than others. 
People can diverge from social structural constraints through intellectual curiosity and honesty. 
A person high in need for cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) and low in 
motivated reasoning will be more aware of and willing and able to address their own poor 
integration. They would also be more likely prepared to consider or construct identities the 
social milieux seeks to neglect. Such identities as “citizen,” “thoughtful consumer,” “amateur 
scientist,” “intellectual”, or “philosopher”—which matter for public understanding of 
science—do not appear to be much encouraged by current social structural processes. In 
addition, large numbers of people are not high in need for cognition nor unaffected by 
motivated reasoning. 
 Consciousness, reasoning, and choice reside in individuals, and thus social structures 
are generated by individuals and must be continuously recreated by individuals. Nevertheless, 
these structures exert tremendous influence on each individual. Social structure is an emergent 
phenomena arising from individuals collaborating. Consider the social structures called 
‘organizations.’ People seek to build organizations so they can pursue overarching goals, 
persist, and members of the organizations find it in their interests to insure such persistence. 
This becomes possible to the extent that organizations are arranged as adaptive systems with 
people as modular components. As organizations persist and come to coordinate the activities 
of large numbers of people, they can acquire processes, information, and other resources far 
beyond what individuals can. These form a source of power for the organization relative to 
individuals. Though a few people in the typical hierarchical organization might to an extent 
steer their organization, for most the organization is largely a fact of the environment—a thing 
that structures what they do and over which they have little effective input or even knowledge. 
As long as enough other people behave as though the organization were a reality, out of 
perceived legitimacy, complacency, fear, or ignorance, the organization remains a reality for 
all others. 
 A final aspect of the social manifestations of agency is social intelligence. A growing 
body of research suggests that social groups can collaborate together to solve problems in a 
way that manifests intelligence at a collective level rather than as a simple sum of individual 
efforts (Woolley, Chabris, Pentland, Hashmi, & Malone, 2010). For example, research on 
transactional memory finds that groups develop divisions of labor with respect to who is 
responsible for remembering what (Hutchins, 1995). Thus, individuals can collaborate to 
produce higher order adaptive systems with emergent forms of intelligence that differ from a 
simple sum of individual intellectual efforts. Organizations naturally seek to efficiently 
combine the intelligence of their members and therefore seek to tap social intelligence.  
2.4 Agency and Cognition 
Agency involves cognition in multiple ways. Agents must cognize their contexts to choose 
appropriate identities. Identities involve goals of varying levels of abstraction. Cognition will 
be needed to appropriately apply such abstractions in given contexts. At a high level of 
abstraction, these goals constitute values. Values, when articulated and critically considered, 
require justification. Such justification will come in the form of belief systems (or 
“ideologies”) regarding authority, personal worth, and what is valuable. Such belief systems 
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will prove essential to reflexivity by suggesting how a coherent self can be built. At a more 
intermediate level, cultures provide conceptual structures for identities—that is, people need 
not understand or construct their identities from scratch but can tap ready-made identity 
constructs, such as the socially-constructed conception of “individual” identity Durkheim 
proposes. A complete theory of agency, then, also requires a theory of cognition. 
 Perhaps a useful starting point for building a theory of cognition is a coherentist 
analysis of knowledge and reasoning (Thagard, 2000; Thagard & Kroon, 2006). In such a 
theory, beliefs can be viewed as nodes in a network. The links between beliefs are ones of 
consistency (coherence) and the totality of nodes and links constitute the belief system. When 
people consider a new belief (which can include empirical evidence and also “hot cognition”—
emotionally tinged information), they insert the new belief in their belief system and seek to 
identify the subset of their beliefs that maximizes total consistency. They then reject those 
beliefs not in this subset. A more realistic model would involve a limited consistency check 
against beliefs that come to mind rather than a complete search of all beliefs. Also, people 
highly interested in a subject may keep in memory alternate belief systems and occasionally 
consider their coherence relative to their primary belief system—allowing people to very 
occasionally jump to entirely different belief configurations. 
 The coherentist theory of cognition is consistent with Lakatos’s (Lakatos & Musgrave, 
1970) philosophy of science. Lakatos points out that scientists do not simply reject a theory 
because there is clear disconfirming evidence. They will reject it only if they have an 
alternative theory that is overall more consistent with the data. Similarly, he points out that 
disconfirming empirical evidence can be rejected because the process that generated the 
evidence may have flaws. A theory may be too compelling, because of its internal consistency 
and consistency with other evidence, that it is more reasonable to question disconfirming 
evidence than to reject the theory. Coherentism, plus the hot cognitions created by social 
identities and other sources, might also explain the rejection of scientific facts by portions of 
the public. Hot cognitions (motivated reasoning) might be included in conceptual networks by 
stipulating sources of consistency that are not warranted by logic, inference, or other forms of 
reasoning. 
 What counts as coherent or consistent for an individual will depend on the form of 
reasoning the individual applies to a belief system. For example, people might reason in terms 
of emotional, metaphorical, or scientific consistency. In dual processing theory (Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999), there is a distinction between central and peripheral processing in which central 
processing involves more thorough, time-consuming, and rational consideration while 
peripheral processing relies on heuristics that are fast but can make systematic and serious 
errors. Another basic reasoning distinction is between system and non-system reasoning 
(Mobus & Kalton, 2015; Rosenberg, 2002). People who fully grasp how systems function can 
understand complex situations better than people who look for simple linear causal chains or, 
worse, associations. Emotional, metaphorical (or associative), group loyalty, peripheral, and 
non-system reasoning are likely more basic and biologically programmed, while logic, 
inference, system reasoning, and the combination of these in scientific reasoning depend on 
emergent cognitive development. People will vary in the degree to which they have developed 
rational thought and the extent to which they use it to overrule non-rational thought. The 
cognitive lapses involved in social identity theory, in which a person is systematically biased in 
favor of their own social group, likely depend on non-rational thought and are likely 
counteracted by cognitive development, to the extent that people achieve such development 
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and to the extent they apply it to thinking about their social identities. Multiple forms of 
reasoning may exist in a person simultaneously. Also, this is not to assert the superiority of a 
scientific mode of reasoning for all purposes. Each form of reasoning has its value and proper 
range of application, but the non-rational forms must in general be tempered by rational 
thought to avoid destructive personal and social consequences. 
 A key point is that people need not have much drive toward consistency. People are 
adaptive systems, so if their current level of inconsistency allows them to achieve their goals, 
they have little reason to fix these inconsistencies. Even if the inconsistencies prevent goal 
achievement, people may not be aware of this or may not have the time or attention resources 
to address the problem. Their attention may be so preoccupied with other considerations due to 
social structural and other factors that they have no time to worry about inconsistencies. In 
addition, people may be rarely aware of inconsistencies in their belief system—as suggested 
above, they may conduct only a quite limited search of their most easily accessible memory 
contents when contemplating an issue. Such limited search may fail to discover 
inconsistencies. In addition, the “most easily accessible memory contents” are relative to the 
currently activated idea or belief, with the next considerations emerging from spreading 
activation that likely reaches only fairly related ideas. Thus, people may well learn different 
cognitive domains, such as tradition and science, in such a way that they are 
compartmentalized, and therefore they are unlikely to include more than one domain in any 
reasoning process. If so, they will not discover inconsistencies. Another form of 
compartmentalization may be a belief that different forms of reasoning apply in different 
domains, so rational considerations apply in science while emotional and intuitive 
considerations apply to tradition. 
 While there are many reasons that people may be content with inconsistencies, some 
may develop a drive toward greater cognitive consistency based on identities that stress 
knowledge and intellectual honesty. For such people cognitive consistency becomes a goal of 
their self-system. Also, some may have greater cognitive capacity to throw at both the 
exigencies of everyday life as well as inconsistencies in their belief systems. Empirically, 
however, it seems that most people are content to live with at least a moderate, if not high, 
level of inconsistency in their belief systems. 
3. AGENCY THEORY AND THE PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE 
While it is not yet sufficiently developed to offer a predictive theory of the public 
understanding of science, agency theory may provide a general framework for approaching the 
analysis of how the public understands science, the impact of social structural features on this 
understanding, and the possible effects of interventions such as public engagement. The 
objective here is to paint a broad picture of how agency theory could provide a rich approach 
for understanding public attitudes toward and knowledge of science and suggest potential 
research questions and hypotheses, not to provide firm evidence for particular views. The goal 
is theoretical breadth and suggestiveness, not empirical investigation. 
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3.1 The Status of Science and Public Distrust 
A general framework for public understanding of science will need some view of the status of 
science. This is best determined empirically, but even empirical data must start with a “prior” 
understanding, in a Bayesian approach to learning. This sketches the authors’ priors. 
 Sociologists of science utilizing qualitative methods (Irwin & Wynne, 2003) have 
questioned whether: science is a “uniquely privileged” perspective, science is an important 
force for human improvement, public ignorance is a major issue in the application of science to 
public issues, science is value-free and neutral as opposed to introducing values that challenge 
the legitimacy of applications of science to public issues. 
 The only source of knowledge about the world external to a person’s subjectivity is 
empirical (ignoring Kantian-style a priori knowledge which is too general to provide specific 
information about most empirical issues). Science is the systematic and cumulative study of the 
empirical world. It has repeatedly shown its capacity to learn about and exert control over the 
empirical world through the development of a plethora of theories, processes, and 
technologies. No other approach to the empirical world has proved remotely as successful—
whether alchemy, astrology, or other assorted metaphorical belief systems. Consequently, 
science is a uniquely privileged perspective that deserves special recognition for its capacity to 
grasp and exert control over the empirical world. Whether that control has been an important 
force for human improvement depends on how it has been used—the application of science is 
determined by economic, policy, and political processes. Thus, the value of science for human 
improvement does not bear on the legitimacy or value of science, though the authors speculate 
that even those raising such questions would quickly retreat to the modern world from a stay in 
the Medieval one. On the other hand, current uses of science may, arguably, eventually lead to 
the end of modern civilization. This is not, however, primarily a fault of science. 
 While science is privileged, its instantiation has limitations. Science constitutes a social 
institution made up of people, with the potential shortcomings of all things human and social. 
A coherentist explanation of cognition allows that people build up well-developed coherent 
networks of beliefs that will be resistant to new theories and explanations, even without 
motivated reasoning and certainly with such reasoning. Thus, it is unsurprising that Kuhn 
(Kuhn, 1996) finds that scientists steeped in a theoretical tradition tend not to budge in the face 
of revolutionary new theories. On the other hand, scientists retire and young scientists without 
a lifetime of accretion of one belief network are better positioned to weigh alternative belief 
systems and select improved theories. While there is stickiness in science, in the long run 
science appears able to improve—revolutionary theories in the natural sciences are not just 
fads but appear to advance knowledge and the capacity to influence the physical world. Also, 
in the realm of most day-to-day as opposed to revolutionary changes, science does constantly 
adjust beliefs and theories in light of new evidence. 
 Science as a social institution is also corruptible. If, for example, commercial motives 
seep into scientific research, as they have in American medical research, and certain outcomes 
are lucrative and errors in findings not easily detected, questions arise about whether the 
research is scientific. Scientists facing various benefits or costs not aligned with the pursuit of 
scientific truth can be motivated to find certain results or hide other results, in violation of 
scientific objectivity. The solution for such problems is to build strong social structural barriers 
between the scientific enterprise and non-scientific motives and institutions. Treating science 
as just another self-interested or biased social institution does not address or correctly 
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characterize the underlying problem. Another implication, however, is that public distrust in 
what portrays itself as science may at times be justified, which complicates analysis of 
resistance to science. 
 Gaps also exist between general scientific knowledge and how such knowledge applies 
in specific and complex contexts in which people are trying to make policy decisions. If these 
gaps are not filled using scientific methods, then scientific knowledge is no guide to firm facts 
about the context. And, of course, science is not able to adjudicate values, which invariably 
arise in policy decisions. Science itself does embody certain values, such as the values of 
knowledge, transparency, and research ethics or such values as simplicity or elegance, but 
these are general values that are beneficial for the scientific enterprise, not values that in some 
way challenge the legitimacy of applying scientific knowledge in policy contexts. Little, 
however, prevents self-interested actors or organizations from invoking scientific certainty in 
contexts in which existing scientific knowledge is insufficient or from implying scientific 
validation of value-imbued policy positions. Again, such maneuvers at times give the public 
good reason to be suspicious of claims to scientific validity in policy discussions. Self-
interested actors with resources can also, however, give the public bad reasons to be suspicious 
of issues around which there is scientific consensus, such as in the case of climate change. 
3.2 Public Misunderstanding and Distrust of Science 
Agency theory offers a number of ways of understanding public ignorance or distrust of 
science, including an explanation of traditionalism and its implications, the influence of social 
identities, and the role of cognitive processes. 
3.2.1 Traditionalism 
As already discussed, children are primed to rapidly and uncritically absorb social identities 
and roles. In addition, the internalized behavioral patterns generally imply certain ideas, 
including about social relationships, authority, personal worth, values, and reality that are 
further reinforced by cultural messages and conceptualizations. For example, in traditional 
societies understandings of the origins, purpose, and workings of the world are embodied in 
certain social roles, the arrangement of social roles, and the rituals prescribed for these roles. 
When people are later exposed to the ideas embodied in their subsumed identities and roles, 
these ideas seem, in the absence of much critical reflection, self-evident and “natural.” Thus 
arises the compelling quality of tradition—with respect to social roles as well as the social 
organization, religious beliefs, and empirical beliefs embodied in these roles. Tradition can be 
compelling in other ways as well. Tradition offers people ready-made explanations for many 
perplexing problems of life, such as who they are, what they are meant to do, and how to make 
various consequential and difficult choices. Also, by placing a person within a known role in 
the social system, typically one that has a tradition-provided explanation of its worth and value, 
tradition can help make people feel valued. Traditions can be totalizing—offering a complete 
map of everything a person needs to know and do over their life and values and beliefs that 
make them feel good about this. Of course, some dominant cultural traditions can be 
oppressive for particular social groups. Such groups are often kept within their ascribed roles 
through rationalizations, structural disadvantage, and coercion—creating tensions that may 
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lead to social change. Nonetheless, for many people tradition is compelling and can stimulate 
motivated reasoning on its behalf. 
 Traditionalism is the uncritical acceptance of tradition. Within modern societies, which 
tend to put people in situations that articulate or raise questions about the assumptions behind 
roles and identities, traditionalism also tends to have a cognitive dimension in which 
traditionalists become aware of the ideas and worldview behind the traditions they accept. For 
those steeped in a tradition and not overly inquisitive, this cognitive dimension serves 
primarily as a defense against challenges to tradition. 
 The question for public understanding of science is how traditionalism interacts with 
such understanding. Certainly traditional worldviews can conflict with science. In the U.S., 
substantial fractions of the public have traditional beliefs that conflict with scientific 
understandings of evolution and the origins of the universe. More broadly, the scientific 
method itself, which values raising questions, examining them empirically, and updating 
beliefs, would seem to be in conflict with any traditionalist approach to knowledge, in which 
certain truths are accepted as obvious and unchallengeable. While much of tradition concerns 
values, which science ultimately cannot legislate, it also contains or implies many empirical 
claims, including ones about origins, naturalness, and consequences that matter to the 
traditional worldview. Science may also weigh in on value claims by pointing to the 
consequences of values. 
3.2.2 Social Identity 
The attractions of tradition operate in substantial part through social identities, but the 
processes of social identity theory also have an impact independent of tradition. People like to 
think highly of their own social identities and poorly of other social groups. They adopt many 
cognitive biases to defend such thinking and, thereby, their social status and, implicitly, the 
coherence and cooperativeness of their own group. Such basic tendencies result in tensions, 
oppression, and, at times, genocide between social groups. Science or at least the appearance of 
science can be utilized as a weapon in such social politics.  
 In the 19th century pseudo-science presented evidence of racial superiority and 
inferiority in the service of imperialism. Science itself was viewed by many as strong evidence 
of the superiority of Western civilization. Such uses of science or the name of science bred 
trust or distrust in science among social groups respectively benefiting or harmed. Currently, 
science figures as a point of contention in culture wars between the center and periphery. 
Urban elites embrace and assert the superiority of a culture in which rationality and science 
figure prominently, while many non-elites embrace and assert the superiority of a culture and 
related identities in which tradition, particularly religion, figures prominently. The latter 
distrust specific core scientific conclusions such as human evolution and the Big Bang. Those 
with stronger religious sentiments question the age of the earth and much of palaeontology. 
Another peripheral source of distrust of science lies in parts of the progressive left. This left is 
not necessarily poor or rural, but it embraces an egalitarianism that contrasts the powerlessness 
of the general public with the concentration of information, resources, and power in existing 
governmental and corporate institutions and thereby creates a picture of the peripherality of the 
public. This in turn drives distrust in applications of science, especially those benefiting 
corporations, such as GMOs, vaccines, and even alternative energy facilities on grounds of 
environmental impacts. 
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 A few elites at the dominant core of society are scientists and a good proportion of 
elites adopt identities that privilege rationality, systems thinking, and being informed by 
science and technology. On the other hand, the preponderance of the public does not perceive 
itself to be amateur scientists and many do not have identities that privilege rationality or 
science. 
3.2.3 Cognition and Distrust of Science 
Both traditionalism and social identity processes play out on the ground of cognition. Both 
depend most heavily on non-rational forms of reasoning that can be countered by cognitive 
development that enhances more rational forms of thought. The sheer prevalence of 
traditionalism and social identity politics even in ostensibly modern societies (Latour, 1993) 
suggests that non-rational forms of reasoning are dominant in many people. 
 A coherentist cognitive system can explain the tendency of people to cling to belief 
systems that make them feel good about themselves, make sense of their world, and are deeply 
elaborated despite scientifically disconfirming evidence against beliefs in these systems. As 
Lakatos suggests, people do not give up a belief system simply because of bits of 
disconfirming evidence. To give up their current belief system, they must have a better 
alternative belief system to adopt. People aware of only a few factual inconsistencies between 
their beliefs and science will not have much reason to switch and drop their current beliefs. 
Also, if people allow non-rational modes of reasoning a large role in deciding the coherence of 
beliefs, they will weigh emotional, metaphoric, peripheral and other considerations that do not 
privilege empirical facts in their belief system, but puts them on par with such considerations 
as positive feelings and sense making. Moreover, people not particularly aware of or concerned 
with inconsistencies can adopt an “all of the above” set of beliefs in which science and beliefs 
inconsistent with some aspects of science are both accepted.  
 This and other background considerations suggest some hypotheses about the possible 
distribution of belief systems in the public. The public may consist of five basic types of 
people. Some may be “the content”—content with an “all of the above” approach because they 
are under little adaptive pressure to immerse themselves in both science and tradition and 
reconcile any inconsistencies they may find between them. As previously discussed, people 
need not have much drive toward belief consistency. A second group may be “weak defenders 
of tradition”—namely, they may perceive a conflict between science and tradition on a few key 
empirical issues. They resolve this conflict by simply agreeing with tradition over science on a 
highly focused set of issues that are critical for tradition and otherwise accepting science in the 
empirical realm and tradition in the realms of values, norms, the after-life, and so forth. The 
preponderance of the public may well be the content or weak defenders of tradition. Such 
positions are adaptive for many people—they are able to happily accept both science and 
tradition for all practical purposes and use what they wish from both. A third group may be 
“weak defenders of science”—people who resolve perceived conflicts between science and 
tradition by siding with science on highly focused empirical issues in contention but otherwise 
accepting science for empirical matters and tradition for non-empirical ones. Besides some 
portions of the Roman Catholic church hierarchy, few people come to mind in this category. 
The remaining two categories have to do with strong defenders of science or of tradition, and 
these categories are apt to be populated but not heavily. A strong defender of science rejects 
tradition and vice versa. Strong defenders must reject one or the other of two important 
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touchstones of American culture. They may have a strong understanding of both belief systems 
and concluded that one is incorrect. Or, perhaps more prevalently, they may have strong 
exposure to only one of the belief systems in their structure of communication, with the result 
that they find the system they understand best as most coherent and, therefore, believable. 
 The above typology makes sense of patterns of data about belief in evolution. The 
general social survey (GSS) has found that only 52% of Americans correctly answer a science 
knowledge question asking about whether humans developed from earlier species of animals 
(National Science Board (NSB), 2014). When, however, the question is presented with an 
alternative wording that starts with a clause asking whether scientists believe in such evolution, 
75% of Americans correctly answer the question. This finding could be explained by weak 
defenders of tradition, who reject the science of evolution but are aware of what scientists 
believe.  
 A more sophisticated but as yet unpublished analyses based on a nationally 
representative Internet panel data (Aaron Maitland, Roger Tourangeau, Ting Yan, Robert Bell, 
& Peter Muhlberger, 2016) finds similar changes in the number of correct responses between 
the original human evolution question and the same question, but with the word “elephant” 
substituted for “human.” This suggests that most of those who do not believe in human 
evolution reject only human evolution and not the evolution of other species, consistent with 
the hypothesis that weak defenders of tradition will only focus narrowly on the most prominent 
issues of contention between religion and science. The data also shows only modest differences 
in knowledge of evolution and general knowledge of science between those who reject 
evolution and those who do not. This is consistent with the view that most of those who reject 
evolution do so while nevertheless well aware of science and happy to apply it. The largest 
differences are between those who accept only an entirely secular view and those who embrace 
young earth creationism. The former score well above average on general science knowledge 
questions while the latter score appreciably below average. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that some fraction of these people form distinctive communities in which they are 
exposed primarily to either faith-based or scientific views and information. 
 A final issue concerns the role of scientific reasoning in the tension between science 
and tradition. People who are steeped in rigorous scientific thought, should, it may seem, favor 
science over tradition or at least find a compromise between the two in which science wins 
most if not all empirical arguments. Indeed, scientists are more likely than the general public 
to, for example, reject religion (Masci, 2009), but not all scientists do and some seem quite 
capable of performing well as scientists while holding strong religious views. These facts 
might be explained through these scientists developing a defensible compromise between 
religion and science or through motivated reasoning and compartmentalization, as previously 
discussed. 
3.3 Social Structure and Public Misunderstanding and Distrust 
Individual-level processes cannot be fully understood without placing them in the social 
system that shapes and directs these processes. Social identity, the structure of communication 
and its impact on attention, and the embeddedness of people in organizations and other 
structures all suggest that little goes on at the individual level that is not appreciably also a part 
of the larger society. Human psychology is permeated by the social, so to study a complex 
phenomenon such as public understanding of science by focusing primarily at the individual 
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level is inadequate. A minimal step in the right direction is to understand the chief social 
structural features that may bear on public understanding of science. This might be done 
relatively uncontroversially by exploring the distribution and content of social identities that 
bear on such understanding, the structures of communication (media, other organizational 
communications, interpersonal discussion) in which people find themselves and how these 
shape understanding, and the organizational and other larger social structures in which people 
participate. Even this, however, is insufficient because social structures and individuals are part 
of a social system with crucial implications for understanding of science. Characterizing this 
system is apt to be a rather controversial and exceedingly complex undertaking. The social 
structural parts, however, can best be understood in terms of how they function in a systemic 
whole that to a degree maintains a status quo. Thus, this section will dive into the most 
controversial issue—the overall systemic context within which understanding of science arises. 
It will propose a controversial and speculative description of that systemic context, but the 
description will be one with rich ramifications for public understanding of science. Whether or 
not the description is substantially accurate or not is less relevant than whether thinking in 
systemic terms could yield insights without which the study of the public understanding of 
science would fall far short of explaining its phenomena. 
3.3.1 A Modest Description of the Controlling Heights of the Social System 
For what purposes is science pursued and to what ends? What is the role of the public and of 
various elites? What are the system’s goals and how does it pursue them? To answer these 
questions, it is necessary to start with a very general description of the social system.  
 In the U.S., science functions as part of a broader system of substantially oligopolistic 
capitalism in which a small elite of business leaders have for many decades and with some 
success sought to monopolize resources and either actively undermined or enjoyed the 
spontaneous decline of the bases of opposition to their power, including academia, labor 
unions, left and liberal political opposition, social movements, social organizations, and 
government itself (Gilens & Page, 2014; Mayer, 2016; Newfield, 2011; Pierson & Hacker, 
2010; Piketty, 2014; Readings, 1997; Skocpol, 2003). Such aggressive consolidation of power 
has been made possible because a majority of this elite favors such consolidation. The elite is 
not of one mind and a minority realize that the country would function far better as a balanced 
system with alternative bases of power. In particular, these alternative bases of power existed 
because they served critical social structural functions that cannot be reduced to business 
values, such as socializing new generations in something other than corrosive self-interest. 
Though the elite is divided we will, for simplicity, refer simply to “the elite” as that part of the 
business elite that has proven dominant. 
 In its pursuit of hegemony, the elite had to overcome a significant hurdle to elite 
control—namely, the pursuit of control by a vanishing percent of the population in a country in 
which political power is elected by a majority of voters. The elite solved this problem primarily 
through wedge politics and a vast messaging apparatus. Wedge politics pit various social 
identities against each other—periphery versus core, sensible average people versus useless 
eggheads, religious versus secular, whites versus minorities, non-poor versus poor, and so 
forth. Of course, a rich, powerful elite delivering a message about good, peripheral, ordinary, 
religious, hard-working people is not typically by itself compelling, so the elite needed to enlist 
substantial networks of messengers whom their public would trust. They have, in fact, built a 
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vast messaging apparatus including religious figures, academics, public intellectuals, think 
tanks, lobbyists, politicians, judges, interest groups, newspapers, radio talk shows, and a 
popular television network. 
3.3.2 Implications for Science 
On the whole, the elite does not benefit from a public that is engaged with policy or thinks 
critically. It benefits from a public that focuses on work, consumption, and family life, follows 
rather than believes it can make up its own mind, and is engaged with social identity wedge 
issues. In the realm of public life, a country that wanted engaged citizens—engaged with 
science or other policy issues—would serve up citizenship identities and values to students 
from early life on, would thoroughly educate students on the most pressing policy debates of 
the time, would give citizens time and public spaces in which to learn about and engage each 
other about political and policy issues, and much more (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2005; Barber, 
1984). This does not remotely describe the U.S. today. Existing organizations, whether federal 
agencies or public interest groups, systematically avoid thoughtful public engagement 
(Muhlberger, Stromer-Galley, & Webb, 2011) 
 Similarly, a country that wanted critical, scientifically-minded thinkers would 
encourage citizen science on a vast scale and would intensively educate students in exercising 
critical and scientific thinking in public and consumer affairs. In particular, the latter would be 
best served by educating students on the insights of the social sciences and humanities with 
respect to political, public, social, and consumer issues—building a broad perspective from 
which the public could reason about values and facts in social and political life. Such a country 
would develop social identities and ideologies of value and self-worth that would invite broad 
swaths of the public to critical and science-pertinent engagement. There has been growth in 
“geek” or “genius” identities, but these are circumscribed because they are meant to be 
exceptional.  
 The picture with respect to scientific and critical thinking is more mixed than it is with 
citizen engagement with policy issues, no doubt in part because elites do need to educate 
technocrats who can innovate and maintain existing productive infrastructure. Not surprisingly, 
universities are increasingly focused on job training, including in the sciences, rather than in 
shaping critical and scientifically-minded citizens and consumers (Newfield, 2011; Readings, 
1997). At more elite institutions, science education entertains the critical thinking needed for 
innovation, but this is a modest percentage of even the science and engineering workforce. The 
social sciences and humanities, which are important to connecting critical and systematic 
thinking to the realm of public affairs, are either shrinking at universities or under budgetary 
and political attack. A certain fraction of Congress would be happy to eliminate research 
budgets for the humanities, social sciences, and those parts of the geosciences that pertain to 
climate change. 
 Overall, the existing social structural conditions in the U.S. discourage engaged, 
critical, and scientifically-minded citizens and consumers. These conditions insure that most of 
the public does not have the education, opportunity, time, leisure time, resources, or 
encouragement to pursue critical reasoning or engage the science applicable to policy and 
consumer issues. A possible research approach to understanding this would be to examine or 
experiment with public engagement on science issues across multiple demographics and then 
project, using time-use data and information about education, resources (Brady, Verba, & 
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Schlozman, 1995), identities, the structure of communication, economies of attention, 
individual differences, ideologies of worth and value and so forth, how many and which people 
could realistically pursue such engagement. There are no doubt substantial socioeconomic 
inequalities in who could participate. In addition, comparison of people who are engaged with 
policy against those who are not might identify both individual and structural differences 
contributing to engagement. 
3.3 Intermediate Social Structure 
Besides pressure from the commanding heights of the social system, numerous more 
intermediate social structures affect public understanding of and attitudes toward science. 
Many of the most relevant such structures fall under the notion of structure of 
communication—standing patterns of communication between people.  
 The mass media and social media are likely to be important means by which attitudes 
toward science and perhaps understanding of science are shaped. The mass media devote only 
a small fraction of their news coverage to science (Tyndall Report, 2015), and only a portion of 
the public regularly follows the news. Social media may have deeper penetration of the public, 
but more needs to be known about what science news and information is conveyed by such 
media, how this is structured, and what impacts it has on participants. Many people go to the 
Internet more generally to learn about science issues either by asking specific science questions 
or looking at science-related articles on online newspapers (National Science Board, 2016, p. 
7). 
 A critical question is the degree to which public opinion and perhaps knowledge of 
science is influenced by opinion leaders with the public itself. Systems theory suggests that 
people may organize the processing and retention of information through transactive 
processing and memory (Hutchins, 1995) in which people in close contact create a division of 
labor with respect to processing and memory, particularly if some people are more interested in 
and capable with respect to a topic. If so, then opinion leadership could prove quite important 
for science policy and attitudes. Even opinion leaders may take their cues from yet more 
capable leaders, creating a hierarchy of leadership in the public that may trace back to belief 
communities and organizational connections. Certainly organizational leaders seeking to 
influence the public have developed networks of people to spread information or 
disinformation.  
 The evidence for the existence of opinion leaders with respect to policy issues is mixed, 
with some studies finding opinion leaders with important effects and others with more 
ambiguous findings (Bennett & Manheim, 2006; Burt, 1999; Robinson, 1976; Troldahl, 1966). 
In general, the issue is much understudied, perhaps in part because of the likely cost and size of 
the task. Ideally, research on opinion leadership would start with a substantial random sample 
of the public and then use snowball sampling to identify the network of people and the 
structure of that network who lead opinion in the mass public. Once the network is identified, it 
would be desirable to see it in action when some pressing new policy or attitudinally-relevant 
issue comes to prominence in the media. The affordability of such research might be enhanced 
by studying not just science attitudes but attitudes relevant to other political and social issues, 
making the research multidisciplinary. A model for such research could be the large project on 
contextual effects in politics conducted by Huckfeldt (1995). Interesting questions include 
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whether the leadership network would be the same for different types of issues and how 
rapidly the network changes over time. 
 If a representative sample of the public and its opinion leaders is available, this would 
also be an opportunity to study how media affects science attitudes and knowledge. 
Researchers could insert themselves into participants’ social networks by asking to, for 
example, “friend” participants on platforms such as Facebook. Ideally, researchers would insert 
themselves into and record as many social media platforms as a person uses. Software on 
participants’ computing devices could directly record social media and Internet use. Rich 
media data could be obtained over time either directly through “spyware” or indirectly through 
recording social media use as “friends” of participants. In addition to recording, researchers 
could experimentally introduce science issues and information into social media and observe 
how the information travels and is transformed online and, resources permitting, in people’s 
offline interactions. Near field detection on cell phones would be helpful in discovering who is 
talking with whom, as might software that records cell phone interactions. Finally, researchers 
could observe as major science issues are reported in the media, recording the media to which 
participants are exposed and observing how this information is transformed in people’s minds 
and interactions. Perhaps such research could take place in a locale in which the researchers 
know that important new science information will become available. They might, for example, 
work with natural scientists who are nearing release of a substantial discovery or policy-
relevant statement. 
 In addition to directly tracking the structure of communication, another avenue for 
research would include charting the public’s identities favorable or unfavorable to science. 
Losch and Nzekwe (2015) have found that science identities play a valuable role in 
undergraduate science education. Much more could be done to identify science-relevant 
identities in the general public and determining their content. How these identities are 
distributed by education, SES, life experiences, and exposure to science information should be 
revealing as to the sources of science attitudes and understanding. As previously explained, 
identity is usually only partially conscious in the form of linguistic structures that are 
accessible to the person and that might or might not correctly capture a person’s automated 
processes. Internalized linguistic structures likely do capture these automated processes. Thus, 
fully capturing identity may require more indirect methods, such as asking about tell-tale signs 
of internalization (Koestner, Losier, Vallerand, & Carducci, 1996; Ryan & Connell, 1989) or 
using reaction times to determine which identities are automated or internalized. 
 Research in public understanding of science might also benefit from automated or 
semi-automated analysis of big data from social media and search websites. This could clarify 
what news and attitudes are reaching the public from what sources and the structure of 
communication between organizations and the public and within the public. As big data 
analytics come to allow better extraction of useful information from text, analyses may also 
begin to capture the meaning of communications. Already, topic modeling could prove helpful 
in identifying the general content of different messages. Eventually, machine learning and 
natural language processing may be up to the task of automatically or semi-automatically 
extracting the mental map or conceptual network in text, providing a wider window into 
meaning. 
 In addition, researchers should more closely examine the messaging networks utilized 
by elites to influence the public. Starting with a number of prominent science issues, research 
could examine how media stories about these issues originated, the content of these stories, and 
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which organizations and actors took up the stories and how they were transformed when 
repeated. Researchers may seek to identify the mental map in each story and use network 
analysis (or even just a comparison of terminology) to determine the closeness of stories from 
different sources. In addition to references within the stories and their timeliness, this could 
clarify the existence of standing patterns of message transmission that constitute messaging 
apparatuses or structures. This could also clarify how these apparatuses function, including 
how they distort or simplify their subject matter. 
4. PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT ON SCIENCE AND SCIENCE POLICY 
Achieving meaningful public engagement with science and science policy is both a moral 
imperative and a potentially difficult and risky undertaking.  
 Human agency is a moral good. Giving people the power to choose their own path in 
life based on critical reflection is a core value of modern civilization and the basis of what 
people think of as freedom and self determination. Thus, that which contributes to human 
agency is a moral good, while that which seeks to circumvent this agency is morally 
undesirable. Though circumventing people’s agency on occasion may not strongly undermine 
that agency overall, a cautionary principle is needed to the effect that people’s agency is to be 
respected even in small matters because it is not known how readily small matters accumulate 
to strongly undermine agency. People often become what is demanded of them and leaving a 
multitude of choices outside their agency could whither that agency. 
 With this in mind, leaving the public out of decisions on science policy is appreciably 
more than a minor infringement on their agency. Nanotechnology, genetic modification, 
artificial life, climate change, energy, ecosystem change, mass extinction, and numerous other 
science and technology issues pose pressing ethical questions that, in a democracy, can only be 
legitimately decided by the public (Benhabib, 1994). Given the likely pervasive effects that 
decisions regarding such science and technology will have on the future of all Americans, 
involving the public in decisions is essential for their agency. Nor is it sufficient to conduct 
standard polls to obtain public opinion on such issues because responses can only reflect the 
public’s values and choices if the public is informed—that is, it knows what it is talking about. 
The only democratically legitimate and ethical option for obtaining guidance on such pressing 
issues is to engage the public in learning about such issues and then in thoughtful discussion of 
the issues.  
 Means of meaningfully engaging the public in such decision making abound. One well-
known approach is deliberative polling (Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002), in which a 
representative sample of the public is selected and then, either face-to-face or online, are 
presented with background information and given a chance to deliberate among themselves 
and query experts. Research shows that such engagement increases knowledge of the issue 
discussed and often substantially shifts attitudes (Barabas, 2004; Farrar et al., 2010; Luskin et 
al., 2002). Countless other practically tested methods exist for informed public deliberation and 
engagement, as outlined in Participedia (www.participedia.net), each with different strengths 
and purposes. Numerous organizations such as AmericaSpeaks, Study Circles, and Public 
Agenda have experience engaging the public with such methods. Online approaches to 
deliberation, such as those utilized by e-democracy.org, have the potential for substantial 
reach. An umbrella organization, the National Coalition for Dialogue and Deliberation points 
to numerous organizational and other resources available for deliberative engagement. As for 
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public engagement with amateur science, which can help familiarize citizens with scientific 
methods and reasoning processes needed to understand policy issues, citizenscience.org 
estimates over one million participants. 
 Public engagement with science policy is morally imperative, methods for informed 
public engagement are available, and an organizational capacity to execute such engagement 
exists and could be expanded. Nevertheless, the amount of informed engagement or citizen 
science in the U.S. reaches a seemingly negligible portion of the public. For example, the over 
one million citizen scientists citizenscience.org claims would constitute less than 1% of the age 
18 to 64 U.S. population, and this does not broach the issue of how many of these projects 
actually involve participants in ways that build their understanding.  
 If elites wanted widespread engagement, vastly more resources would be expended 
than are currently and, likely, far more people would be engaged. Instead, some evidence 
suggests that public interest groups and government agency personnel shun deliberative public 
engagement in favor of methods better suited to pushing the public to a predetermined 
conclusion (Muhlberger et al., 2011). The preponderance of the public is uninformed and 
leaders prefer to treat it as a resource that can be persuaded to embrace certain viewpoints 
rather than as agents that should be given the balanced information needed to make up their 
own minds. As previously explained, a small fraction of the population exerts outsized 
influence on the social, economic, and political systems and this fraction benefits, at least in 
the medium term, from an under-informed and easily manipulable public. Social structural 
conditions, which are at least influenced if not controlled by these elites, help insure just this 
kind of public.  
 Business elites typically want particular outcomes when it comes to science and 
technology policy issues, because they have generally favored free reign to pursue innovations 
and industry, regardless of potential ethical implications or global consequences. Elite 
preferences will likely be to give free reign to nanotechnology, genetic modification, and 
artificial life while ignoring ecosystem change and mass extinction of the Earth’s species. In 
the science policy domain of climate change, a powerful messaging system is opposed to 
knowledge and action. Clearly, some elites are concerned with climate change and the 
impending Apocalypse, but these elites have not as yet had a decisive influence on public 
opinion in favor of effectively addressing the issue. Current actions on climate change will not 
be effective in avoiding catastrophic changes to the climate system. 
 Successful public engagements on specific science policy issues typically need to be 
blessed and funded by elites. All else will be either irrelevant or pursuing asymmetric action 
against concentrated power and resources. Academics and dialogue organizations pursue 
deliberative engagement with thousands of citizens a year at a price of millions of dollars. In 
contrast, elites expend tens of billions a year in advertising, public relations, political 
campaigns, messaging machines, think tanks, academic chairs, media organizations, lobbyists, 
and pressure groups. These expenditures lead to public influence efforts that almost never 
provide balanced information and purely rational appeals. They play to and help insure the 
perpetuation of a public governed by non-rational cognitive processes. Simultaneously, elites 
benefit from ineffectual deliberation efforts by pointing to hundreds of such efforts as evidence 
of a commitment to democratic engagement. Also, some of the best intellects with respect to 
social issues and public engagement are tied up pursuing these efforts, removing them as 
potential leaders of more serious challenges to concentrated power. 
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 Beyond the societal imbalance between opportunities for reasoned engagement versus 
manufactured consensuses, successful public engagement with a politically significant fraction 
of the public runs a risk of unleashing dangerous forces. Currently, a substantial portion of the 
public falls into the categories of ‘the content’ and ‘weak defenders of tradition.’ Neither of 
these types have fully wrestled with potential inconsistencies between tradition and science, 
and we do not know what would happen if they did. A strong rejection of science is not 
unlikely. People do come out of deliberations feeling good about their fellow deliberants, even 
those with whom they disagree, and with changed and better informed opinions. Most 
deliberations, however, focus on policy issues about which participants know little and whose 
connection with their values are at best obscure. Participants readily coalesce around the more 
sound expert opinion presented in background briefings. Researchers, however, have little 
experience with deliberations that point out strong conflicts between science and tradition. 
Even if participants in such deliberations emerged with a warm glow, if they become a 
politically significant factor on some policy issue there is apt to be backlash from any 
messaging machine that prefers different conclusions. Then there would ensue a contest 
between the public’s capacity for reason and its likely more substantial capacity for non-
rational thought, with vastly more resources poured into reinforcing the latter. 
 Lest we be dubbed the Eeyores of public engagement, some possibilities exist for 
strengthening deliberative public engagement and for pursuing forms of engagement that have 
at least a faint hope of breaking through concentrated power. Researchers should be 
contemplating strategies to grow the scale of effects of deliberative engagement. After a 
representative-sample deliberative poll, organizers might seek to amplify the impact of the 
results on the public. This might be achieved, for example, through a publicity campaign, 
including having deliberants select representatives who can speak about the deliberation 
reasoning and results with the mass media and disseminate results in social media. Another 
possibility would be a website in which the public can learn in depth about the deliberation. 
Such a website might seek to match the values and demographics of site visitors with specific 
deliberants and give the visitors a chance to see the similarity of these deliberants and their 
thoughtful views about the issues. Social identity processes including trust in similar others 
should prove more persuasive than just seeing an averaged poll result. Deliberations might 
specifically seek to include opinion leaders and perhaps celebrities to enhance their impact on 
the larger public.  
 Another type of strategy would be to adopt deliberative public engagement methods 
that could reach larger publics. Online engagement offers one possibility. Teledemocracy 
(Becker & Slaton, 2000) could reach a large public at low marginal cost. In teledemocracy, 
people are sent background materials by mail, asked to discuss the materials with family and 
friends, and are told they will be contacted by an interviewer who will ask about their final 
views. Some evidence suggests that the background material, not discussion, is what enhances 
the knowledge of deliberants (Muhlberger & Weber, 2006), though having to explain one’s 
conclusions to an unknown person may motivate careful reading of the materials. More 
generally, engagement researchers need to learn more about what happens, particularly in the 
long run and in the face of non-rational persuasion attempts, when people are confronted with 
tensions between science and their values and traditional beliefs. 
 Beyond seeking to shore up deliberative public engagement, organizers may wish to 
consider alternative forms of engagement that are more likely to be self-sustaining and self-
replicating—hence able to create a mass movement capable of resisting concentrated power. A 
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possibility is the development of democratic community. Much of the public feels it should be 
“citizens” and engaged with the community, but they have little idea of how to go about this. 
Organizers may succeed in developing small citizens’ groups that focus on getting to know 
each other personally, talking about concrete community problems, and taking small actions to 
address these problems. Small successes would enhance motivation and group cohesion and 
allow the groups to address larger and more complex problems. A successful group would 
have its members bring in more potential members and eventually spawn new but strongly 
interconnected groups. Interconnections could be nicely managed in the form of sociocracy 
(Endenburg, 1998; Pivato, 2009). As these groups become more prevalent, they can address 
and discuss ever wider social issues. With time, these groups could deliberate and publicize 
their views on major science policy issues. Even if such groups could succeed in just a few 
larger cities or a few percent of the public, their views could have an impact on science policy 
issues in that these views would be the considered, informed, vocal, and unmanipulated views 
of the public. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has introduced a theory of human agency that synthesizes insights about agency 
from a number of established psychological theories, some of which shade into sociology. 
Agency theory addresses two key difficulties in research on public understanding of science. 
One is the need for a theoretical framework that can encompass both psychological and 
sociological explanations. The second is the need for a framework that can encompass both the 
evident non-rational nature of public opinion on many policy issues but allow for people to 
develop the more rational thinking needed for real public understanding of science.  
 Agency theory clarifies the strong hold that tradition has on many people and the 
tensions between such traditionalism and science. In particular, children rapidly absorb the 
behavioral patterns and understandings of culturally prominent identities while incapable of 
critically evaluating what they absorb or, eventually, remembering the details and context of 
what they have absorbed. Such lack of awareness is consistent with encapsulation and 
subsumption—aspects of agency theory that can explain why people may be appreciably 
unaware of the contents of identity “modules” they have absorbed. When later encountering 
the cultural beliefs inscribed in their absorbed identities, these beliefs will appear to be self-
evident. Unquestioned cultural beliefs are in some tension with science in that a scientific 
mindset involves questioning and rigorous testing of apparent truths, and at times science 
directly conflicts with cultural beliefs pertaining to the empirical world. 
 Uncritically absorbed identities and unquestioned truths work well in traditional 
societies, but modern societies typically require people to negotiate their lives through a 
multiplicity of roles and identities, both in themselves and in others, with accompanying 
questions raised about apparent truths. In modern societies, people are pressed to resolve 
conflicting internal identities. They can do so through reflexivity and self-development. In 
reflexivity, a person builds a model of an identity by describing that identity and its outputs to 
themselves—thus, the model is linguistic. They can use language and accompanying reasoning 
processes to think through the identity, clarifying conflicts with other identities and other 
inconsistencies and problems. Values, a sense of ethics, valuating belief systems, self-
knowledge, and knowledge of society and history can help the reflexive process develop a 
more unified self. Self-development requires the additional step of conscious attention being 
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used to reshape identities to be consistent with reflexive choices. Attention is used to retrain 
habitual actions to conform to reflexively modified or chosen identities. Agency is the capacity 
for reflexivity and self-development. It can be thought of as free choice and self-determination. 
 Agency theory also requires a theory of cognition in that agents must cognize their 
contexts to choose appropriate identities, identities imply and motivate certain cognitions, 
identities come in packages that can include conceptual content, and reflexivity operates 
through cognition, including valuative belief systems or ideologies of authority, personal 
worth, and value. A coherentist conceptual network model of cognition may prove fruitful. In 
such a model, beliefs form nodes that are connected with edges of varying degrees of 
consistency. In a coherentist account, people do not dispense with a belief system simply 
because of one failure, nor should they. They will dispense with a belief system only when a 
better alternative system, that explains more than the current system, is in view. This makes 
belief systems “sticky” and difficult to change. In addition, as adaptive agents, people only 
need as much consistency as necessary to achieve their goals, which may be far from perfect 
consistency. People may be unaware of or not have the time to address inconsistencies. Beliefs 
may also be compartmentalized so that a limited search of beliefs most strongly associated in 
memory does not bring to light inconsistencies between belief networks. 
 What counts as consistency or consistency-conferring reasoning may vary across 
persons and contexts and can include non-rational and rational types: emotional, metaphoric, 
associative, peripheral, non-systemic, logical, inferential, and systemic. Cognitive development 
involves developing a capacity for rational thought, though other forms of thought may play a 
role even in people fully capable of rationality. 
 Persons are modules within larger social structural systems that shape and direct their 
agency. Individuals are connected to social structures through their social identities and social 
identity processes. The latter make people highly biased in favor of their own groups while 
biased against other groups. More sophisticated cognitive development can undermine such 
biases, though without eliminating social identity itself. Social structures can alter the focus of 
people’s attention and their patterns of communication—the economy of attention and the 
structure of communication. Thereby, social structures can affect people’s goals and their 
identity integration. Structures can also influence the available distribution of identities, the 
ease with which various goals can be achieved, valuative belief systems, and environmental 
identity triggers. People high in need for cognition and low in motivated reasoning may be less 
susceptible to social structural shaping. Collective intelligence suggests the possibility of 
memory and reasoning distributed across groups of people. 
 Agency theory helps explain the role of tradition in modern societies and its convoluted 
relationship with science. Tradition has proved remarkably resilient in ostensibly modern 
societies. This can be explained by the seeming obviousness of traditions inscribed in social 
identities. And, despite pressures toward reflexivity, tradition can be resilient due to the 
possibilities for tradition to survive through multiple avenues, including the capacity for people 
to live with contradictions. Contradictions in identities and beliefs are typically ignored if 
people are achieving their goals or if they are unaware of a sufficiently compelling alternative 
belief system. People can be too distracted to notice contradictions or too busy to invest the 
time to address them. Compartmentalization of belief networks can insure a low incidence of 
thinking about contradictions between science and tradition. Some people may utilize forms of 
reasoning, such as association, that fail to detect real contradictions. Some may develop views 
that resolve or appear to resolve tensions between tradition and science. Tradition may 
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stimulate motivated reasoning in its defense by offering people ready-made explanations for 
key problems of life, such as who they are, what they are meant to do, and how to make 
difficult choices. This operates in substantial part through identity. Other forces may push for 
greater consistency, both individual differences and social structural factors. At a social-
structural level, belief communities emerge to defend traditional identities and associated 
beliefs. In the U.S., an important social structural difference is between a core of urbanites who 
emphasize science and a periphery of more rural people who emphasize religion.  
 Considerations such as those above suggest a potential typology of beliefs in the public 
with respect to tradition and science. This includes: a) the content who happily include both 
tradition and science in their beliefs because they are unaware of or do not care to examine 
tensions between these beliefs, b) weak defenders of tradition who side with tradition in a few 
key factual matters but otherwise accept both belief systems, c) weak defenders of science, d) 
strong defenders of tradition who reject substantial swaths of science and e) strong defenders 
of science. This typology helps explain research findings on public attitudes toward evolution. 
 The larger social-structural context of science can in part be understood by clarifying 
the general purposes of the social system. Multiple lines of evidence suggest that the purposes 
of the social system are increasingly under the influence of a portion of the business elite. Not 
surprisingly, the social system is arranged in a manner that concentrates power at the top rather 
than involving a wide public. Social structural features and influences could be arranged to 
strongly involve people in public policy issues, including science policy. Instead, conditions 
including the form of education, opportunity, time, leisure time, and resources discourage 
engaged, critical, scientifically-minded citizens and consumers. The public is encouraged to 
focus on consumption, family, and narrow social identities that can be used as wedge issues. 
Elites do need scientists and engineers who can think creatively and question existing 
assumptions. Education, however, has been substantially refocused on job training at most 
universities rather than broad thinking about social and political matters. A few more elite 
institutions teach innovative thinking.  
 Researchers might study the conditions that give rise to a disengaged public by 
examining time-use patterns of everyday life, education, engagement resources, available and 
utilized identities, the structure of communication, economies of attention, individual 
differences, ideologies of worth and value, particularly across people who are deeply engaged 
and those who are not. This will no doubt show substantial socioeconomic differences and 
identify multiple roadblocks to engagement by ordinary people. Research is needed to develop 
better means of measuring identities and their effects. More research is also needed on how the 
public organizes its opinions on key policy issues, particularly the possibility of an important 
role of opinion leaders and the structure of message and cue taking between opinion leaders 
and between opinion leaders and organizations, including organized belief communities and 
various media. An interdisciplinary effort that included the spread of views regarding science 
policy along with other policy issues may make such research more attractive to funders. 
Researchers might introduce software on participants’ devices to track the flow and content of 
communications. Policy issues could be experimentally introduced into a network of 
participants. Big data analytics, particularly of text and network connections, could be helpful 
in following the flow and transformation of beliefs. Researchers could also train their efforts 
on identifying the structure and functions of the messaging machines used by elites. 
 Public engagement on science policy is morally imperative, but also a difficult and 
risky undertaking. Democratic legitimacy requires authoritative public input on the ethics of 
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key science policy issues that will likely greatly affect the public in the future, including such 
issues as climate change and genetic modification. Authoritative input depends on an informed 
public. Given that the public is largely uninformed with respect to such issues, authoritative 
input requires approaches such as deliberative polling. Such approaches have been well 
researched and various organizations offer a capacity for well-done deliberation efforts. 
Nevertheless, a majority of business elites have already taken positions on many science policy 
issues. They have been in favor of unbridled research and commercial application and have not 
been great defenders of the environment in recent decades. Some evidence indicates that elites 
reject deliberative public engagement in favor of means in which they better control the 
outcome. Deliberative public engagement reaches only a small fraction of the public, while the 
messaging machines of elites reach much of the public and are lubricated with vastly more 
funding. Currently, deliberative public engagement poses no threat to elite control. Were it to 
become so, a quite asymmetric power struggle would likely ensue. In addition, deliberative 
engagement that pits science and tradition may unleash the potential for the “content” and 
weak defenders of tradition, groups that likely make up the majority of the public, to more 
strongly embrace tradition over science. 
 There may be better ways to pursue public engagement. This paper discusses means of 
strengthening the effects of deliberative public engagement on the wider public. Deliberation 
efforts might focus on opinion leaders. Deliberation results could be disseminated online in a 
way that people could see the reasoning of participants similar to themselves. Online 
deliberations could reach large numbers of people, if only the public could be steered to 
participate. Teledemocracy, which combines reading materials with eventual phone interviews, 
could reach larger numbers of people and educate them on a subject. Finally, organizers may 
wish to experiment with “democratic community,” an approach that goes beyond existing 
deliberative engagement by being self-sustaining and self-replicating, potentially creating a 
larger engaged public. Such groups should prove attractive to the many people who would like 
to be “citizens” but do not know what that identity entails. A group would begin as people 
getting to know each other, taking on small civic activities and mutual aid, and eventually 
introducing larger and more complex issues. Each group could spawn new groups and the 
collection of groups would be increasingly effective in having its voice heard. Intergroup 
coordination could take place along the lines of the sociocracy model. If only a few percent of 
the public in a few cities could be thus organized, it would still represent a substantial new 
force on policy issues. 
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